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JUDICIAL ILLUMINATION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL "TWILIGHT ZONE":
PROTECTING POST-ARREST, PRETRIAL
SUSPECTS FROM EXCESSIVE FORCE AT
THE HANDS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
Abstract: Police brutality is one of the most serious and enduring human
rights violations in the United States today. One means by which victims
may seek redress is under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a civil cause of
action against state actors who deprive individuals of their constitutional
rights. This Note examines § 1983 litigation brought by post-arrest, pre-
trial detainees alleging the use of excessive force by law enforcement
officials. There is currently a circuit split regarding whether such claims
must be brought under the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unrea-
sonable seizures of the person or the Fourteenth Amendment's guar-
antee that no State will deprive a citizen of liberty without due process of
law. This issue's resolution has significance as to the plaintiffs burden of
proof, and thus, his or her likelihood of attaining a favorable verdict. This
Note contends that the best approach is a hybrid model that involves a
synthesis of both Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment standards because
it is both practical and mindful of recent lines of U.S. Supreme Court
precedent.
INTRODUCTION
As Connie Jo Austin and Steven Snyder returned to the United
States from a visit to Mexico, customs agents found a small amount of
marijuana inside their car.' Following this discovery, the agents seized
them and transported them to a detention facility. 2 While in custody,
officers repeatedly assailed Austin and Snyder without provocation.'
Although Austin and Snyder fully cooperated with their inquiries,
agents beat them until they fell to the floor.' These assaults were so
' Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155, 1157 (10th Cir. 1991).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
1357
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severe that both lost consciousness . 8
 After Austin and Snyder awoke,
these beatings continued. 6
Following these attacks, officers fastened Austin's and Snyder's
handcuffs so tightly that both lost feeling in their hands.? During this
period, officers denied their requests for water.8 Additionally, the
agents refused to grant them restroom access, causing both to soil
their clothes. 9 Austin and Snyder were then forced to remain in these
clothes overnight." After twelve hours of custody and without filing
charges, the officers finally released them."
As this case exemplifies, police brutality is one of the most serious
and enduring human rights violations in the United States today. 12
The problem is nationwide and institutional in nature." Each year,
police officers engage in severe beatings and unnecessarily rough
physical treatment" of suspects in every region of the nation." One
avenue of redress for victims of police violence is 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
which provides a civil cause of action against state actors who deprive
individuals of their constitutional rights."
In the context of police brutality, § 1983 actions are intended to
fulfill two principal purposes,I 7 First, they are designed to compensate
victims of excessive force through an award of coinpensatory darn-
5 See id.
6 See Austin, 945 F.2d at 1157.
7 Id.
Id.
Id.
10 Id.
u Austin, 945 F.2d at 1157.
12 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND Ac-
commtnixry IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (Human Rights Watch ed., 1998).
13 Id.
14
 This type of unnecessarily rough police behavior is what this Note refers to as exces-
sive force. Excessive force can be generally understood as force applied by a police officer
where the amount of force used is disproportionate to the amount that was actually
needed. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 390 (1989).
15 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 12, at 1. This information is based on re-
search conducted in fourteen U.S. cities over two and a half years. Id. In researching this
data, Human Rights Watch interviewed and corresponded with attorneys representing
victims alleging ill treatment by police, representatives of police department internal af-
fairs units, police officers, citizen review agency staff, city officials, Justice Department
officials, representatives of federal U.S. Attorneys' offices, local prosecutors' office repre-
sentatives, experts on police abuse, and victims of abuse. Id.
16 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). Thus, in order to maintain a § 1983 action, plaintiffs must
allege a specific constitutional violation. See id.
17 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 12, at 119; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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ages. 18 Second, Congress intended these actions to make police
officers and departments answerable to constitutionally required
standards of conduct."
One important and controversial area of § 1983 litigation in-
volves claims brought by post-arrest, pretrial detainees" alleging the
use of excessive force by law enforcement officials. 21 The controversy
centers upon which constitutional provision these claims must be
brought under: the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreason-
able seizures of the person 22 or the Fourteenth Amendment's guaran-
tee that no State will deprive a citizen of liberty without due process of
law." Currently, the federal circuit courts of appeals are split on this
issue. 24
This controversy has significance beyond issues of mere constitu-
tional interpretation because a plaintiff's burden of proof and likeli-
hood of securing a favorable verdict are significantly influenced by
which constitutional standard governs his or her claim." If a court
determines that the Fourth Amendment applies, a plaintiff need only
show that the force exerted was objectively unreasonable based on the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the incident. 26 If the Four-
teenth Amendment governs, however, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that an officer applied force maliciously and sadistically to cause
harm, irrespective of the unreasonableness of the force."
10 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 51110717 note 12, at 119; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
19 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supm note 12, at 119; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
20 This term refers to suspects whom police have already arrested but remain in cus-
tody either for administrative booking procedures or for extended confinement, as in the
case of a suspect who is denied bail. Because not all post-arrest detainees proceed to the
trial phase of the criminal process, with instances of police brutality during early custodial
phases, it is not yet clear if an arrestee will be charged and brought to trial. Thus, use of
the term "pretrial detainee" refers both to those suspects detained pending trial and those
suspects in early post-arrest custody who may or may not eventually proceed to trial. See
cases cited infra note 316. •
21 Sec, e.g., Wilson v. Spain, 209 F.3d 713, 714 (8th Cir. 2000).
22 U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated ....").
25 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law
24 Sec cases cited infra note 106.
25 See E. Bryan MacDonald, Graham v. Connor: A Reasonable Appivach to Excessive Force
Claims Against Police Officers, 22 PAC:. L.J. 157, 180 (1990).
ss Graham, 490 U.S. at 388, 396.
Secjohnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973); MacDonald, supra note 25,
at 180.
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Thus, the use of unreasonable force against a pretrial detainee
passes constitutional muster in jurisdictions applying the Fourteenth
Amendment when a plaintiff cannot establish an officer's subjective
malice. 28
 An identical use of force, however, is found to violate the
Constitution in jurisdictions utilizing a Fourth Amendment stan-
dard. 29 In 1989, in Graham v. Connor, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved
this issue as it applied to arrestees by holding that during an arrest,
the Fourth Amendment provides the proper constitutional standard
to assess excessive force claims." The Court, however, refused to de-
termine the proper standard applicable to claims brought by pretrial
detainees following an arrest. 3 i
Much of the confusion over this issue sterns from the elusive con-
stitutional position of pretrial detainees from a textual standpoint. 32
The Fourth Amendment forbids the use of excessive force during a
"seizure" or arrest whereas the Eighth Amendment supplies a similar
protection in the post-arrest context for convicted criminals. 33 Argua-
bly, a pretrial detainee fits into neither of these categories. 34 One
court attempting to resolve this issue noted that the period between
arrest and conviction is a constitutional "twilight zone," due to the
absence of a textually explicit source of constitutional protection."
Because of the need for constitutional consistency and the grow-
ing problem of police brutality as a public policy concern, this twilight
zone is badly in need of illumination." The federal judicial system can
accomplish this end by formulating a uniform approach to adjudicate
pretrial detainees' excessive force claims. 37
 This Note argues that the
best approach involves a synthesis of both Fourth and Fourteenth
25 See, e.g., Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1449 (5th Cir. 1993).
ri) See, e.g., Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.
3° Id. at 394.
3 ' Id. at 39511.10.
32 See Wilson, 209 F.3d at 715.
33 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
54 Wilson, 209 F.3d at 715. It is unclear if a pretrial detainee is still being "seized" or ar-
rested for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. See id. It is clear, however, that the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment does not protect individuals who
have not yet been convicted and sentenced. Graham, 490 U.S. at 392 n.6 (citing Ingraham
v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977)).
55 Wilson, 209 F.3d at 715.
36 See HUMAN R1GIITS WATCH. supra note 12, at 1.
37
 See id.
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Amendment standards." This approach is both practical and mindful
of recent lines of U.S. Supreme Court precedent."
Part I of this Note reviews the U.S. Supreme Court's historical
applications of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments up to its
landmark 1989 decision in Graham.4° Part I.A examines the Court's
interpretations of the Unreasonable Seizure Clause of the Fourth
Amendment and how the Court has applied it to claims of excessive
force.'" Part I.B focuses on the development of the Fourteenth
Amendment's doctrine of substantive due process as it relates to ex-
cessive force claims. 42 Part I.0 discusses the Court's decision in Gra-
ham and then highlights the questions it raises for pretrial detainees'
excessive force claims."
To answer the questions raised by Graham, Part II of this Note
reviews the Court's post-Graham treatment of the two pertinent consti-
tutional provisions: the Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth
Amendment's doctrine of substantive due process." Part ILA dis-
cusses how, following Graham, the Court has steadily expanded the
scope of Fourth Amendment protections." Part II.B similarly exam-
ines the Court's post-Graham efforts to limit the applicability of sub-
stantive due process claims."
Part III then examines the various approaches adopted by the
lower federal courts in adjudicating pretrial detainees' excessive force
claims following Graham. 47 Part III.A discusses the approach that relies
exclusively on the Fourteenth Amendment's doctrine of substantive
due process." Part III.B addresses the continuing seizure approach,
which applies the Fourth Amendment until the trial phase of the
criminal process." Part III.0 examines the hybrid approach, which
applies the Fourth Amendment until a detainee has been brought
before a judicial official for a probable cause hearing and then applies
the Fourteenth Amendment.50
sa See infra notes 270-377 and accompanying text.
59 See infra notes 270-377 and accompanying text.
4° See infra notes 56-106 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 56-70 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 71-84 and accompanying text.
49 See infra notes 85-106 and accompanying text.
44 See infra notes 107-153 and accompanying text.
45 See infra notes 111-131 and accompanying text.
49 See infra notes 132-153 and accompanying text.
47 See cases cited infra note 106.
48 See infra notes 160-201 and accompanying text.
49 Sec infra notes 202-225 and accompanying text.
59 See infra notes 226-269 and accompanying text.
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Finally, Part IV critically analyzes these approaches and argues
that based on U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the hybrid model is the
best-reasoned and most practical approach." Part WA argues that the
substantive due process model is unable to account for the Court's
post-Graham expansions of Fourth Amendment protections. 52 Part
IV.B similarly contends that alternative approaches are unable to ac-
count for the Court's efforts to limit the availability of substantive due
process claims." Part IV.0 maintains that the hybrid model is able to
harmonize both lines of U.S. Supreme Court precedent interpreting
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 54 Finally, Part W.D posits
that the hybrid approach is the most practical model in terms of insti-
tutional feasibility and common sense.55
I. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S APPLICATIONS OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT'S DOCTRINE OF
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS TO EXCESSIVE FORCE CLAIMS
A. Fourth Alnendment fulisprudence Prior to Graham v. Connor
To evaluate the merits of applying the Fourth Amendment to
pretrial detainees' excessive force claims, it is important to gain an
understanding of that Amendment's protections. 56 The Fourth
Amendment is commonly understood as a limitation on the power of
police to search for and seize evidence, instrumentalities, and fruits of
a crime." This Amendment, however, also protects the right of citi-
zens to be secure in their persons.58 An illegal arrest or other unrea-
sonable seizure of a person is itself a violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment.59 Fourth Amendment cases involve balancing an individual's
expectation of privacy against the government's interest in investigat-
51 See infra notes 270-377 and accompanying text.
52 See infra notes 275-303 and accompanying text.
53 See infra notes 304-324 and accompanying text. •
54 See infra notes 325-396 and accompanying text.
55 See infra notes 347-377 and accompanying text.
56 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
57 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 5.1 (3d ed. Supp. 2003).
58 Id.
59 Id.
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ing and preventing crime.° The Amendment itself sets the minimum
standard for a seizure to be constitutional: it must be reasonable."
In 1985, in Tennessee v. Garnet; the U.S. Supreme Court first ap-
plied the Fourth Amendment to a suspect's claim of excessive force
during a seizure. 62 The Garner Court characterized the Fourth
Amendment test as a means of determining whether, under the total-
ity of the circumstances, a particular type of search or seizure was
justified. 63 Under this analysis, an officer's use of force becomes exces-
sive when it is objectively unreasonable." In an attempt to guide this
analysis, the Garner Court noted that an application of the Fourth
Amendment must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion
against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify
that intrusion.66
In post-arrest excessive force situations, there is no issue as to
whether a seizure has occurred because the suspect is in police cus-
tody.° Rather, the key inquiry is whether the seizure is still taking
place at the time the force is exerted.° If the seizure is still ongoing
when force is applied, it is subject to the reasonableness requirement
of the Fourth Amendment.68 If it is determined that the seizure has
ended, however, the Fourth Amendment will be inapplicable.° In-
stead, the source of constitutional protection, if any; must be found in
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
60 Thomas K. Clancy, The Supreme Court's Search for a Definition of n Seizure: What Is a '`Sei-
zure" of a Person Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment?, 27 AM. Cain. L. REV. 619, 620
(1990).
61 Id, (citing U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV).
62 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985). Garner involved a § 1983 action filed after a police officer killed
a fleeing teenage burglar despite being reasonably sure the suspect was unarmed. Id. at 3.
The offices' had acted in accordance with a Tennessee statute providing that if, after an
officer gave notice of an intent to arrest, the suspect resists or flees, the officer may use all
necessary means to effect the arrest. Id. at 4. Applying the Fourth Amendment balancing
test, the Court concluded that the suspect's fundamental interest in his own life out-
weighed the government interest in effective law enforcement. Id, at 9-10.
63 Id. at 8-9.
64 Id. at 7.
66 Id. at 8.
e6 Sec Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1444 (5th Cir. 1993).
67 Sec Pierce v. Multonmah County, 76 F.3d 1032, 1042 (9th Cir. 1996).
66 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989).
69 See, e.g., Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 192-93 (7th Cir. 1989). This is because the
Fourth Amendment, by its own terms, regulates "seizures." See U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
Therefore if the police conduct in question did not occur during the course of a seizure, it
is not within the ambit of that Amendment's protection. See id.
70 See Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 194.
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B. Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process .
 urisprudence
Prior to Graham v. Connor
Substantive due process is the body of law created by the courts
that uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
review government action on its substantive merits." This review is
accomplished by the application of a means-ends test that determines
whether an unacceptable deprivation of liberty has occurred, regard-
less of the procedures followed by the State. 72 Substantive due process
law is not governed by a set of controlling principles. 73 Instead, the
doctrine's essence is best captured by the most persistently recurring
theme in due process cases: the government must not treat citizens
arbitrarily. 74
 Therefore, substantive due process adjudication does not
divide into categories but occurs along a continuum. 75 This contin-
uum is marked by what the U.S. Supreme Court interprets to be
widely shared beliefs and intuitions that impose duties on government
and define standards of reasonableness. 7°
In 1952, in Rochin u California, the U.S. Supreme Court first ap-
plied a substantive due process analysis to a claim of excessive force. 77
Addressing the claim of an arrestee whose stomach was forcibly
pumped by order of his arresting officer, the Court held that police
conduct which "shocks the conscience" offends Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process. 78 The Court reached this conclusion by relying on
the basic canons of decency and fairness, which embody the concept
of ordered liberty. 79
71 Michael J. Phillips, The Non-Privacy Applications of Substantive Due Process, 21 RUTGERS
537, 539 (1990). One commentator states:
Although substantive due process as just defined differs considerably from
the procedural due process that traditionally has been the focus of the due
process clauses, these two forms of due process do share common features.
First, both require the government to have deprived the claimant of life, lib-
erty or property before their distinct protections come into play. Second, nei-
ther a procedural nor a substantive due process claim can be based on merely
negl igen t government behavior.
Id. at 540-41.
72 Id. at 540.
" Richard H. Fallon, jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitu-
tional Remedies, 93 Comm. L. Rix. 309, 322 (1993).
74 Id. at 322-23.
m Id. at 323.
76 Id.
77 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
78 Id.
79 Id. at 174.
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In 1973, in Johnson u Glick, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
expanded upon the Rodtin standard.8° The Glick court introduced a
four-part test to deterthine precisely when the use of police force
shocks the conscience.81 These factors include: 1) the need for appli-
cation of force; 2) the relationship between the need and the amount
of force that was used; 3) the extent of the injury inflicted; and
4) whether the force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose
of causing harm. 82 Most federal courts applying the Fourteenth
Amendment to pretrial detainees' excessive force claims utilize the
Glick standard.85 Because the substantive due process test involves a
subjective inquiry into the defendant's state of mind, courts and
commentators agree that it is less likely to result in plaintiffs' verdicts
than the objective Fourth Amendment analysis. 84
C. Graham v. Connor: The Fourth Amendment Is the Exclusive Standard
Governing Claims of Excessive Force During an. Arrest
In 1989, in Graham v. Connor, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified its
interpretation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments as each
relates to police brutality. 85 The Court held that the Fourth Amend-
ment provides the proper constitutional standard to assess claims of
excessive force during the course of an arrest. 88 In settling this consti-
tutional issue, the Graham Court found that the lower court had erred
in applying the Glick substantive due process test to an arrestee's claim
that his arresting officers beat him before and after lie was hand-
cuffed and placed in a squad car. 87
88 Johnson v. Click, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973).
at Id.
82 Id.
83 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 393.
84 See, e.g., Wilson v. Spain, 209 F.3d 713, 716 (8th Cir. 2000) (rioting that the substan-
tive due process test is "more burdensome - than the Fourth Amendment standard); Jill 1.
Brown, Comment, Defining "Reasonable" Police Conduct: Graham v. Connor and Excessive Force
During Arrest, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1257, 1271 (1991) (characterizing the substantive due pro-
cess test as a more "onerous" burden of proof than the Fourth Amendment objective rea-
sonableness standard); see also MacDonald, supra note 25, at 180 (noting that under the
Fourth Amendment standard, more § 1983 excessive force claims will withstand motions
for summary judgment and directed verdict than under a Fourteenth Amendment stan-
dard).
e6 See 490 U.S. at 393.
86 Id, at 388.
97 Id. at 393.
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The Court held that the Fourth Amendment provides the proper
standard in the arrest context because it contains an explicit textual
source of constitutional protection against that type of physically in-
trusive governmental conduct. 88
 According to the Court, the reason-
ableness of an officer's use of force must be determined by reference
to the particular facts and circumstances including: 1) the severity of
the crime at issue; 2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat
to the safety of the officers or others; and 3) whether the suspect ac-
tively resists arrest or attempts to evade arrest by flight. 89
The Graham Court explained that this test is completely objective
in that it does not consider an officer's subjective motivation in apply-
ing force.° According to the Court, an officer's malicious intentions
do not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively rea-
sonable use of force; nor does an officer's good intentions make an
objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional." Thus, according
to the Graham Court, the substantive due process test improperly in-
quires into an officer's state of mind to determine whether the force
exerted was excessive. 92
The Court noted further that all excessive force claims must be
analyzed by first identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly
infringed upon." In most instances, the Court observed, that will be
either the Fourth or Eighth Amendment because they are the two
primary sources of constitutional protection against physically abusive
governmental conduct." In this particular instance, because the force
occurred during the course of Dethorne Graham's arrest, it was
clearly a seizure governed by the Fourth Amendment. 95
 Commenta-
tors agree that Graham's removal of the Fourteenth Amendment's
98 Id. at 395.
89 Id, at 396.
" 490 U.S. at 397.
91 Id.
92 Id. (rejecting the applicability of the substantive due process test in these circum-
stances and disagreeing with the suggestion of the Court of Appeals that the subjective
elements of the substantive due process test are merely another way of describing conduct
that is objectively unreasonable).
93 Id. at 394.
94 Id. at 394-95.
D' Graham, 490 U.S. at 394, 395 (explaining that this holding merely makes explicit
what was implicit in the Garner Court's analysis: that all claims of excessive force during the
course of an arrest should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness
standard).
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subjective malice requirement is more beneficial to plaintiffs alleging
the use of excessive force. 96
Despite resolving this constitutional issue as it applied to arres-
tees, the Court declined to address the question of whether the
Fourth Amendment continues to provide the accused with protection
from excessive force beyond the point at which arrest ends and pre-
trial detention begins.97 Citing its 1979 decision in Bell v. Walfish," the
Court held that at a minimum, the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive
force that amounts to punishment. 99 In Bell, the Court reviewed due
process challenges to institutional practices of a New York penal facil-
ity housing pretrial detainees. 190 The Court held that the proper in-
quiry was whether such practices 191 amount to punishment of the de-
tainee. 02 if such practices are punitive, then the detainee's due
process rights are violated." The Bell Court concluded that a practice
is not punishment if it is rationally related to a legitimate non-punitive
government purpose and is not excessive in relation to that pur-
pose. 104
Despite reaffirming Bell's constitutional minimum that protects
the accused from punishment in the post-arrest context, the Graham
Court explicitly left open the question of whether additional protec-
tion flowed to this class of individuals from the Fourth Amendment. 106
By leaving this issue unresolved, Graham has led federal courts to
99 See, e.g., MacDonald, supra note 25, at 180. But see Michael C. Fayz, Comment, Gra-
ham v. Connor: The Supreme Court Clears the Way for Summary Dismissal of Section 1983 Exces-
sive Force Claims, 36 WAYNE L. Roy. 1507, 1527 (1990) (arguing that by eliminating the
question of an officer's subjective malice, an important factual determination for a jury is
removed from excessive force cases; therefore, excessive force claims are more likely to be
disposed of at the sununary judgment phase).
97 Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10.
9s 441 U.S 520, 535 (1979).
99
 Gmliam, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10.
'99 441 U.S. at 523.
101 The practices at issue included: housing inmates in cells containing double bunk
beds; preventing detainees from receiving books and magazines unless mailed directly
from a publisher; refusing to allow detainees to receive packages containing food or per-
sonal property; conducting unannounced searches of prisoners' cells at irregular intervals;
and conducting body cavity searches following visits from outsiders. Id. at 525-30.
192 Id.
193
 See id.
194 Id.; see Phillips, supra note 71, at 558 (noting that although the majority opinion did
not use the term 'substantive due process," the case involved a due process challenge to
substantive prison regulations and used a means-ends standard to review that challenge).
105 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10.
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adopt divergent approaches in adjudicating excessive force claims
brought by post-arrest, pretrial detainees.'"
IL THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S POST-GRAHAM V. CONNOR
EXTENSIONS OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS AND
RESTRICTIONS ON SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
To answer the question explicitly left open by Graham v. Connor, it
is necessary to examine the U.S. Supreme Court's post-Graham treat-
ment of the two pertinent constitutional provisions: the Fourth
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment's doctrine of substan-
tive due process. 1 °7
 Although the Court has not decided an excessive
force case since Graham, its attitudes towards these two constitutional
provisions illuminate the major issues present in the excessive force
context.'" Section A examines the U.S. Supreme Court's post-Graham
expansions of the scope of Fourth Amendment protections." Section
B then discusses the Court's affirmative efforts to limit the applicabil-
ity of the doctrine of substantive due process."°
A. Post-Graham Expansions of Fourth Amendment Pmtections
Although the Graham Court explicitly refrained from deciding
whether the Fourth Amendment provides protection to pretrial de-
tainees, the U.S. Supreme Court has since held that the Fourth
Amendment does protect this class of individuals.'" Two years after
Graham, in 1991, the U.S. Supreme Court decided County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin." 2
 In McLaughlin, the Court reaffirmed and expanded
upon its earlier 1975 decision in Gerstein v. Pugh, in which it held that
the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable
106 See, e.g., Moore v. Novak, 146 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment continues to provide the accused with constitutional protection following an
arrest); Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155, 1160 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment provides the accused with constitutional protection until the accused has
been brought before a judicial officer for a probable cause hearing); Wilkins, 872 F.2d at
192-93 (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment exclusively governs excessive force
claims in the post-arrest context).
1 °7 See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 274 (1994); County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 47, 56 (1991); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981); Ger-
stein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975).
1 °8 See Pierce v. Multnomah County, Or., 76 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1996).
I" See infra notes 111-131 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 132-153 and accompanying text.
111
 See McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 47, 56.
114 Id. at 44.
20031	 Protecting Pretrial Suspects from Excessive Force 	 1369
cause before the extended detention of suspects following an
arrest.H 3 The plaintiffs in Gerstein were detained for extended periods
without hearings to determine if there was probable cause for their
arrests and continued detention.'" The Court held that during the
period of pretrial detention, failure to provide detaine es with such
hearings violated their Fourth Amendment rights.II 5
The Court in Gerstein explicitly recognized the Fourth Amend-
ment's. general applicability to the period of pretrial detention.U 6 It
noted that the Fourth Amendment was tailored specifically for the
criminal justice system and held that its balance between individual
and public interests defines the process that is due for seizures of per-
sons in criminal cases, including their pretrial detention. 117 According
to the Court, during pretrial detention, the Fourth Amendment fur-
nishes protection from all unfounded interferences with liberty. 118
Despite this clear and explicit indication that the Fourth
Amendment applies to pretrial detainees, the Court in Graham (whose
membership had changed considerably since Gerstein) 119 appeared to
cast doubt on this notion by refusing to state whether the Fourth
Amendment protects pretrial detainees from excessive force.'" Two
years after Graham, in McLaughlin., however, the Court clarified its po-
sition on this issue by reaffirming and expanding upon Gerstein. 121
At issue in McLaughlin was what constituted a prompt determina-
tion of probable cause for purposes of Gerstein. 122 Although reluctant
to announce that the Constitution requires a specific time limit, the
Court held that jurisdictions providing probable cause hearings
within forty-eight hours of arrest, as a general matter, comply with the
Fourth Amendment.'" The Court recognized that because of the
need to provide police departments with flexibility, under certain cir-
cumstances (for example, holidays and three-day weekends), it may
be permissible under the Fourth Amendment to wait as long as four
113 Id. at 47, 56.
114 See 420 U.S. at 105 n.l.
115 Id. at 114.
116 Id. at 125 n.27.
117 Id.
"8 See id. at 114.
115 In the period between Gerstein and Graham, justices Douglas, Stewart, Burger, and
Powell were replaced by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, respectively.
I" Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 39511.10 (1989).
121 McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56.
144 Id. at 50.
'2 Id. at 56.
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days before providing a probable cause hearing. 124 Thus, the Court
explicitly recognized, at least in some situations, that the Fourth
Amendment continues to apply to pretrial detainees up to four days
following an arrest. 125
In 1994, in Albright v. Oliver, the U.S. Supreme Court provided
another broad post-Graham interpretation of Fourth Amendment pro-
tections. 126
 Albright involved a plaintiffs claim that the State's filing of
charges against him without probable cause violated his substantive
due process rights. 127 The Court dismissed his claim, holding that it
needed to be brought under the Fourth Amendment. 128 Following its
reasoning in Graham, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment
provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against
this particular sort of governmental conduct. 129 According to the
Court, the Fourth Amendment governs claims of malicious prosecu-
tion because it was drafted to protect against all pretrial deprivations
of liberty."° The Albright Court clearly interpreted the Fourth Amend-
ment more expansively than did the Graham Court, which refused to
determine whether the Fourth Amendment applied past the point of
arrest into the period of pretrial detention."'
B. Post-Graham Restrictions on the Doctrine of Substantive Due Process
In addition to expanding the scope of the Fourth Amendment
following Graham, the U.S. Supreme Court has also limited the avail-
ability of substantive due process claims." 2 Commentators attribute
this effort to the fact that substantive due process is the most prob-
lematic category in constitutional law due to its historic dependence
on the personal feelings of justices.'" The U.S. Supreme Court itself
124 Id. at 58-59.
125 See id. In all situations, however, the Fourth Amendment applies to pretrial detain-
ees for at least two clays into their detention. Id.
126 510 U.S. at 274.
127 Id. at 271.
t25 Id.
129 Id. at 273-74.
125 Id. at 274.
13' See Albright, 510 U.S. at 274; Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10.
122
 See, e.g., Albright, 510 U.S. at 271-72.
133 See Eric S. Connuck, Constitutional Law: The Viability of Section 1983 Actions in Re-
sponse to Police Misconduct, 1990 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 747, 777 (1992) (classifying substantive
due process as ''shorthand for judicial privilege to condemn things that the judges do not
like or cannot understand") (quoting Gurnz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1406 (7th Cir.
1985) (Easterbrook, J., concurring)); Fallon, supra note 73, at 314.
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has even acknowledged this problem and has attempted to resolve
jos,'
In determining that the Fourth Amendment was the proper con-
stitutional standard governing claims of excessive force during an ar-
rest, the Graham Court. clearly manifested its intent to limit the doc-
trine of substantive due process. 133 According to the Court, § 1983
analysis must begin by identifying the specific constitutional right al-
legedly infringed upon by a state actor. 133 The Court held that when
there is an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against
the type of governmental conduct alleged, that Amendment, not the
more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the
guide for analyzing that claim. 137
The Graham Court recognized that after the Second Circuit's de-
cision in Johnson v. Glick, the vast majority of lower federal courts had
indiscriminately applied a substantive due process standard to all ex-
cessive force claims.'" The Court openly chastised this practice and
characterized it as an undesirable expansion of substantive due proc-
ess law. 133 Thus, the Court, in mandating the exclusive use of the
Fourth Amendment, explicitly recognized the wholesale elimination
of a broad range of substantive due process claims.")
The U.S. Supreme Court continued this effort five years later in
Albright, which in addition to providing a source of Fourth Amend-
ment expansion also limited the availability of substantive due process
claims. 141 In holding that Kevin Albright's § 1983 claim of malicious
prosecution must be brought under the Fourth Amendment rather
than the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court once again expressed its
desire to limit the doctrine of substantive due process. 142 The Court
noted its general reluctance to expand that doctrine because its vague
standards lend themselves to irresponsible decision making." 3
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia noted that Graham re-
quires the rejection of substantive due process claims wherever a
mi Albright, 510 U.S. at 271-72 (noting that the doctrine of substantive due process
should not be expanded because it lacks guideposts for responsible decision snaking).
13"3
	 U.S. at 395.
136 Id. at 394.
137 Id. at 395.
138 Id. at 393.
139 Id.
140 Sec Graham, 990 U.S. at 395.
141 510 U.S. at 271.
142 Id. at 271-72.
143 Id. (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115,125 (1992)).
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more specific constitutional provision might apply. 144 According to
Scalia, the pretrial period was no longer an area where substantive
due process claims could be maintained against state officials because
more specific constitutional protections clearly applied. 145
 The
Court's effort in Albright to restrict the applicability of substantive due
process was also recognized in Justice Kennedy's concurring opin-
ion. 146
According to Kennedy, this narrowing of substantive due process
was a trend, traceable back to the Court's 1981 decision in Parratt
Taylar 147
 In Parratt, the Court held that plaintiffs cannot maintain
§ 1983 claims based on due process violations if a State provides an
adequate post-violation remedy. 148 The plaintiff in Parratt was a Ne-
braska prison inmate who filed a § 1983 claim against the prison alleg-
ing that by negligently losing his property, it violated his Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights. 149
Although the Court recognized that the plaintiff's claim satisfied
the prerequisites of a valid clue process claim, it held that he could
not proceed under § 1983 because the State's tort remedies provided
a means of redress for that deprivation.'" According to the Court,
these remedies were adequate to protect plaintiffs' Fourteenth
Amendment rights on their own, without the need for an additional
federal cause of action under § 1983. 151
According to Justice Kennedy's Albright concurrence, Parma rep-
resents an affirmative effort by the Court to limit the scope of substan-
tive due process claims by preventing such actions from creating a sys-
tem of federal tort law under the Fourteenth Amendment.I 52
Commentators agree that Parratt is best understood as an "abstention
decision," which calls upon federal courts to avoid substantive clue
444 See id, at 276 (Scalia, J., concurring).
145 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The Bill of Rights sets forth, in the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, procedural guarantees relating to the period before and during trial ....
Those requirements are not to be supplemented through the device of 'substantive due
process.'").
146 See 510 U.S. at 284 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
447 Sec id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Parrott, 451 U.S. at 535114).
148 See 451 U.S. at 544.
148
 Id. at 529.
1 " Id. at 536-37.
151 Id. at 545.
152 Albright, 510 U.S. at 284 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693,701 (1976)).
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process rulings where state tort law adequately protects constitutional
values)"
III. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO EXCESSIVE FORCE CLAIMS
IN THE POST-ARREST CONTEXT
Despite recent cases clearly articulating its interpretations of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the U.S. Supreme Court's fail-
ure in Graham v. Connor to specify whether pretrial detainees are pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment has led the lower federal courts to
answer that question in three different ways) 54 Each of these ap-
proaches differs in regard to its interpretation of constitutional pro-
tections)" Section A discusses those jurisdictions refusing to apply
the Fourth Amendment beyond the initial act of arrest)" These ju-
risdictions interpret the Fourteenth Amendment to be the sole source
of protection for pretrial detainees) 57
Section B examines those jurisdictions that. interpret the Fourth
Amendment to furnish protection for the entire time a suspect re-
mains in state custody)" Finally, Section C addresses those circuits
that apply the Fourth Amendment until a suspect has been brought
before a judicial officer for a probable cause hearing and thereafter
apply the Fourteenth Amendment) 59
A. The Substantive Due Process Approach: Excessive Force Claims of Pretrial
Detainees Are Governed Exclusively by the Fourteenth Amendment
One approach taken by the federal courts to protect post-arrest
suspects from excessive force relies exclusively on the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment)" For example, in 1989, in
Wilkins v. May the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals refused to apply
the Fourth Amendment to a claim of excessive force during an inter-
rogation. 161 Luther Wilkins, Jr., following his arrest for suspicion of
bank robbery, was taken to a police station and placed in a holding
155 See Fallon, supra note 73, at 311.
154 See, e.g., Moore v. Novak, 146 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1998); Austin v. Hamilton, 945
F.2d 1155, 1160 (10th Cir. 1991); Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 192-93 (7th Cir. 1989).
155 See, e.g., Moore, 146 F.3d at 535; Austin, 945 F.2d at 1160; Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 192-93.
156 See infra notes 160-201 and accompanying text.
167 See, e.g., Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 192-93.
158 See infra notes 202-225 and accompanying text.
159 See infra notes 226-269 and accompanying text.
16° See, e.g., Id.
161 See id. at 191, 192.
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ce11. 162 Later that day, in an interrogation room, two FBI agents ques-
tioned Wilkins.'" Wilkins alleged that during questioning, one of the
agents pressed a handgun against his temple.'"
Finding the Fourth Amendment to be inapplicable in this con-
text, the court noted that the seizure of Wilkins ended upon the
completion of his arrest.'" The opinion noted that the pertinent
question was whether the constitutionality of the manner or duration
of Wilkins's detention shifted from a Fourth Amendment question to
one of due process)" The court recognized that after conviction, ex-
cessive force claims must be brought under the Eighth Amend-
ment. 167 It noted the unusual situation that would arise if the Consti-
tution forbade the use of excessive force during an arrest, allowed it
as soon as the arrest was complete, and then forbade it again after the
suspect was convicted) 68
The court suggested that one way of filling this unattractive gap
in the Constitution is to interpret a seizure as continuing beyond the
point of arrest in order to place it within the scope of the Fourth
Amendment)" The court, however, rejected this notion based on two
objections. 17° First, the court noted that the criteria used to determine
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment do not apply after an
arrest ends."' The usual issue in a Fourth Amendment excessive force
case is whether there was probable cause for the force used.'" As the
court observed, probable cause is determined by examining whether
the force used to seize a suspect was excessive in relation to the dan-
ger he or she posed if left at large.'" The court noted that these issues
are not present when a suspect is already in custody.'"
Second, the court objected that such an application of the
Fourth Amendment would be an unwarranted expansion of constitu-
tional law.'" To illustrate this point, the court hypothesized an alter-
182 Id. at 191.
163 Id.
164 Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 191.
10
 Id. at 192.
166 Id. at 193.
' 67 Id.
'68 Id.
166 Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 193.
' 7° Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 193-94.
' 75 Id. at 194.
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nate situation in which the defendant merely stuck his tongue out at
Wilkins. 176 According to the court, this would be unreasonable but
there are no limiting principles within the Fourth Amendment to
prevent such behavior from being deemed unconstitutional)" For
the Wilkins court, the problem with this continuing seizure concept is
that it attenuates the element that makes police conduct problematic:
the unreasonable deprivation of a person's liberty) 78 After an arrest is
complete, the court noted, the arrestee has already lost his or her lib-
erty.'" Thus, the court rejected the prospect of a seizure continuing
past the point of initial arrest's°
Instead, the Wilkins court found that the proper constitutional
standard to analyze this claim was the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment's' The court noted that if there was ever a strong
case for a substantive due process claim, it was where a post-arrest,
pretrial suspect has been brutalized while in custody. 182 Employing the
Johnson u Glick test, the court noted that the question before it was
whether police questioning at gunpoint was so conscience shocking as
178 Id.
177 Id.
170
 Id.
:" Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 194.
18° Id.
181 See id. There is considerable support among commentators for this approach. See
H.L. "Mike" McCormick, Excessive Force Claims Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 29 Unu. LAW,
69, 72 (1997). For example, one commentator states:
The logical basis for application of the Fourteenth Amendment to excessive
force claims is the Amendment's prohibition against punishment without due
process.... [Sluch excessive force violates the detainee's substantive due
process rights. In the case of a suspect who has been handcuffed and placed
in a police cruiser, any use of force thereafter could very well constitute "pun-
ishment' prior to conviction in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment....
The federal courts of appeals continue to properly apply the Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process standard in the context of persons in
custody awaiting trial.
Id.; see also Phillips, supra note 71, at 557 (noting that the most important set of protections
for pretrial detainees stems from the Fourteenth Amendment as a matter of substantive
due process). But see Connuck, supra note 133, at 751 (noting that the substantive due
process test is internally inconsistent because it simultaneously requires both an objective
and a subjective analysis; that is, its first two factors, the need for force and the relationship
between this need and the atnourit of force used, call for a determination of whether the
police conduct was objectively unreasonable, whereas the fourth factor requires an exami-
nation of the officer's subjective intent).
182 Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 194.
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to constitute a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of the Due
Process Clause."3
Applying similar reasoning, in 1993, in Valencia v. Wiggins, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides the exclusive constitutional stan-
dard protecting pretrial detainees from excessive force."' There, Raul
Jose Valencia claimed that three weeks into his pretrial detention for
drug charges, jail officials choked him to the point of unconscious-
ness, and upon his awakening, handcuffed and beat him."5 The court
held that the Fourteenth Amendment was the appropriate standard
because the force was applied after the incidents of arrest were com-
pleted, after the plaintiff had been released from the custody of his
arresting officer, and after he had been in detention awaiting trial for
a significant period of time."6
The court next cited three justifications for its refusal to apply
the Fourth Amendment to Valencia's claim."7 First, the court held,
the Fourth Amendment provides weak textual support for an exten-
sion to pretrial detainees.'" Because it protects against unreasonable
"seizures," the court noted, the Fourth Amendment is directed to the
initial act of restraining an individual's liberty. 189 According to the
court, the three-week duration of Valencia's detention made it espe-
cially clear that his seizure had ended.'"
The second justification the Wiggins court advanced for its refusal
to extend the Fourth Amendment to the post-arrest context centered
on the U.S. Supreme Court's unwillingness to do so in similar con-
texts."' For example, in Bell v. Wolfish, the court noted, the U.S. Su-
preme Court was unwilling to hold that a pretrial detainee had a pri-
vacy interest in his person protected by the Fourth Amendment. 192
The third justification the court gave was the U.S. Supreme Court's
633 See id. at 195.
181 981 F.2d 1440, 1445 (5th Cir. 1993).
198 Id. at 1442.
188 Id. at 1944.
'87 Id.
188 m.
"6 Wiggins. 981 F.2d at 1444.
190
191 Id.
192 Id.; see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979). Similarly, the Wiggins court ob-
served, in Hudson v. Palmer, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the Fourth Amend-
ment does not protect a prisoner's privacy interest in his cell or his possessory interest in
personal property contained in his cell. Wiggins, 981 F.2d at 1449 (citing Hudson v. Palmer,
468 U.S. 517, 526 (1989)).
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explicit recognition in Graham that the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vides a constitutional basis for pretrial detainees' excessive force
claims. 193 The court noted that although Graham left open the ques-
tion of whether the Fourth Amendment applies post-arrest, it did
hold that the Due Process Clause shields pretrial detainees from the
use of excessive force that amounts to punishment. 194
More recently, in 1997, in Riley v. Dorton, the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals also held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause provides the exclusive standard governing pretrial detainees'
excessive force claims.' 95 At issue there was Charles Riley's claim that
police officers beat him at a booking facility following his arrest. 196
Rejecting Riley's suggestion that the Fourth Amendment governed his
claim, the court emphasized that the events at issue took place two
hours and almost one hundred miles from the time and place of his
arrest. 197 The court declined to apply the Fourth Amendment until an
arrestee leaves his or her arresting officer's custody because that ap-
proach makes Fourth Amendment coverage depend on the fortuity of
how long an arresting officer happens to remain with a suspect. 198
In holding that post-arrest excessive force claims are governed
exclusively by the Due Process Clause, the court noted that a depriva-
tion of liberty must be distinguished from a condition of detention. 199
The court observed that, in evaluating the constitutionality of such
conditions, the U.S. Supreme Court in Bell specifically directed that
the proper inquiry is whether those conditions or restrictions amount
to punishment of the detainee under the Due Process Clause.N° Ac-
cording to the Riley court, this interpretation results in the best fit
with the body of U.S. Supreme Court precedent interpreting the
Fourth Amendment as governing the initial decision to detain the
accused, and interpreting a seizure as a single act, not a continuing
process. 201
193 1Viggins, 981 F.2d at 1444.
194 Id.
195 115 F.3d 1159, 1166 (4th Cir. 1997).
196 /d. at 1160.
197 Id, at 1161.
198 Id. at 1164.
199 Id. at 1162.
200 Riley, 115 F.3d at 1162.
291 Id. at 1163 (citing California v. 1-lodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 625 (1991); Bell, 441 U.S. at
533-34)).
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B. The Continuing Seizure Approach: The Fourth Amendment Continues to
Provide Protection in the Post-Arrest Context
In contrast to those courts relying exclusively on the Fourteenth
Amendment to adjudicate excessive force claims in the post-arrest
context, other circuits have interpreted the Fourth Amendment to
provide concurrent protection.202
 For example, in 1997, in United
States v. Johnstone, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
Fourth Amendment continues to provide protection after a suspect is
taken into custody. 203
 The case involved a suspect's allegation that his
arresting officer beat him in a stationhouse garage following his ar-
rest.2" The defendant argued that the district court erred by applying
the Fourth Amendment because the arrest was over when he applied
the force at issue. 05 Without determining the precise point at which
an arrest ends and pretrial detention begins, the court adopted the
continuing seizure concept 246 According to the court, the station-
house beating occurred while the arrest was still in progress and was
therefore governed by the Fourth Amendment as required by Gra-
ham. 2o7
The Johnstone court interpreted Graham to hold that an arrest is a
continuing event because the force used against Graham occurred
after police took him into custody. 208 In holding that the defendant
committed the assault during the arrest, the Johnstone court observed
that a seizure can be a process or a continuum, which is not necessar-
ily a discrete moment of initial arrest.209
 The court read Graham to
hold that a person can remain free for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment for some time after being taken into police custody. 210
Thus, the seizure did not automatically end at the moment of arrest
and Fourth Amendment protection continued beyond that point 2 11
Similarly, in 1998, in Moore v. Novak, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals found that the Fourth Amendment continues to protect the
accused from excessive force in the post-arrest context. 212 There, Fre-
202
 See, e.g., Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. 1985).
2°3 107 F.3d 200, 206-07 (3d Cir. 1997).
204 Id. at 203.
205 Id. at 205.
206 See id. at 205. 200-07.
on See id. at 205.
2"Joltnstone, 107 F.3d at 205.
209 Id. at 206.
210 Id. at 206-07.
211 See id. at 207.
212 See 146 F.3d at 535.
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derick Darnell Moore claimed that following his arrest, and while his
arms were handcuffed behind his back, jail corrections officers threw
him to the floor and repeatedly shocked him with a stun gun until he
was unconscious. 2 " These events occurred after Moore's arrest had
been completed and while he was securely in the custody of jail
officials.214 Despite the termination of Moore's initial seizure, the
court found the proper standard governing his claim to be the rea-
sonableness test of the Fourth Amendment. 215 According to the court,
Moore was still being seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment
even though his arrest had ended and he was being held in a deten-
tion facility.216
In 2001, in Fontana v. Haskin, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reaffirmed its pre-Graham position that the Fourth Amendment ap-
plies after an arrestee is in custody. 2" The Haskin court held that a
seizure continues throughout the course of a criminal tria1. 218 Haskin
involved an arrestee's claim that one of her arresting officers inap-
propriately touched and sexually harassed her during transport to a
police station. 20 The court noted that although this was not tradi-
tional excessive force, it fell within the Fourth Amendment's reason-
ableness standard, which forbids unreasonable intrusions of an arres-
tee's bodily integrity. 22o
According to the Ninth Circuit, once a seizure begins, it contin-
ues while the arrestee remains in the custody of an arresting officer
and until the termination of criminal proceedings. 221 Therefore, the
use of excessive force by the defendant. during transport to a police
station gave rise to a Fourth Amendment claim. 222 The Haskin court
recognized that Mia Fontana's claim could have also been brought
213 Id, at 534.
214 Id. at 532, 534.
215
 See id. at 535.
216
 Sec id.
21 262 F.3d 871, 879 (9th Cir. 2001).
213 Id. (citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 278 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(noting that a seizure continues throughout a critninal trial)). According to one commen-
tator, the continuing seizure approach best achieves a balance between individual liberties
and the public's interest in law enforcement because it promulgates a single objective
standard. See Connuck, supra note 133, at 777. Connuck argues that consistency is better
served by this objective inquiry than a Fourteenth Amendment analysis because the latter
generates too much uncertainty by inquiring into an officer's subjective motivations. Id.
219 262 F.3d at 875.
222
 Id. at 878-79.
221
 See id. at 879.
222
 See id.
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under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 223 It noted,
however, that because the force occurred while she was being "seized"
by the police, it was better framed as a Fourth Amendment issue. 224
That is, under Graham, if a claim is covered by a specific constitutional
provision, it should be brought under that standard rather than the
doctrine of substantive clue process. 225
C. The Hybrid Model: The Fourth Amendment Applies
Until a Probable Cause Hearing
A third approach taken by federal courts combines the continu-
ing seizure and substantive due process approaches by applying the
Fourth Amendment to post-arrest claims of excessive force until the
suspect receives a probable cause hearing. 226 After that point, the
Fourteenth Amendment is applied. 227 For example, in 1991, in Austin
v. Hamilton, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the end of
an arrest does not preclude application of the Fourth Amendment. 228
There, the plaintiffs' complaint alleged that following their arrest for
marijuana possession, they were repeatedly assaulted without provoca-
don, denied water, refused restroom access, and forced to remain
overnight in the clothes they subsequently soiled. 229
At the outset of its inquiry into the appropriate constitutional
standard, the Austin court recognized that there are different points
along the "custodial continuum" along which variable constitutional
standards attach. 238
 This continuum runs through initial arrest, pre-
hearing custody, pretrial detention, and post-conviction incarcera-
tion."' The court noted that although Graham avoided a direct pro-
nouncement on whether the Fourth Amendment applied following
223 Id. at 881.
224 Haskin, 262 F.3d at 881.
225 Id. at 882.
226 See, e.g., Austin, 945 F.2d at 1160. According to some commentators, this is the best-
reasoned approach taken by the lower federal courts. See, e.g., Wayne C. Beyer, Police Ails-
conduct: Claims and Defenses Under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses, 30 URB. LAW. 65, 74 (1998). According to Beyer, applying the Fourth Amendment
until a probable cause hearing makes sense from both a legal and common-sense perspec-
tive because at this stage the actions of the police in seizing the individual are either
ratified or rejected. Id. at 76 (citing Grant v. City of Twin Falls, 813 P.2d 880, 886-87
(Idaho 1991)).
227 See Austin, 945 F.2d at 1160.
228
 See id.
228 1d. at 1157.
250 Id. at 1158-59.
231 Id. at 1158.
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an arrest, Graham's recognition of the broad applicability of the
Fourth Amendment led to its application to post-arrest police con-
duct. 232 According to the Austin court, despite U.S. Supreme Court
precedent suggesting that Fourth Amendment protection was limited
to the initial act of arrest, Graham reopened that question. 233
In holding that the Fourth Amendment applies until a probable
cause hearing, the court pointed out that, according to the U.S. Su-
preme Court's decisions in Gerstein v. Pugh and County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, the Fourth Amendment provides the standard to assess
the constitutionality of prolonged, post-arrest custody of pretrial de-
tainees. 234 The Austin court recognized that although this was not
conclusive authority in the context of excessive force, it found it per-
suasive in the absence of other guiding principles. 235 The court con-
cluded that just as the Fourth Amendment provides the applicable
limitations regarding both duration and legal justification for pretrial
detention, its protections also persist to restrict the treatment of pre-
trial detainees prior to a probable cause hearing. 236
The Austin court next responded to the two arguments advanced
by the Seventh Circuit in Wilkins against extending the Fourth
Amendment to pretrial detainees. 2" The court first addressed the as-
sertion that the Fourth Amendment issues of whether a suspect poses
a danger to an arresting officer and the surrounding community are
mooted once a suspect is in custody. 238 The Austin court held that
these concerns were not inapposite because suspects remain a threat
to arresting officers and nearby persons. 239 The court also noted that
as escape risks, suspects remain a threat to the general community. 240
Next, the court responded to the Wilkins court's objection that
application of the Fourth Amendment would be an unwarranted ex-
pansion of constitutional law due to a lack of limiting principles
within the Amendment itself.20 The court observed that the same ob-
jection could be made in any excessive force context and noted that
232 See Austin, 945 F.2d at 1159.
233 See id.
Id. at 1162.
233 Id.
236 Id.
2" See Austin, 995 F.2d at 1160 n.3.
238 See id.
229 Id.
240 Id.
2" See id. This refers to the contention that the Fourth Amendment could be used to
sue an officer who merely sticks his tongue out at a suspect. See Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 194.
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the standard of reasonableness is an adequate safeguard against trivial
claims,242
This same approach was adopted by the Ninth Circuit, in 1996, in
Pierce v. Mullonmah Counly. 243 That case involved Stephanie Pierce's
allegations that during the four hours she spent in jail, following her
arrest for furnishing false information to a police officer, she was re-
peatedly assaulted by corrections officers. 244 Pierce argued that the
trial court erred in utilizing the Eighth Amendment to determine
whether the officers' use of force was excessive.245 According to the
court, the question before it was whether the Fourth Amendment
protects an arrestee during the second custodial stage: post-arrest but
pre-arraignmen t custody.246
The court noted that after Graham, the appropriate constitutional
standard governing treatment at various stages of custody is an open
question of law subject to de novo review. 247 The court observed that
the defendant's argument that the Eighth Amendment controlled the
situation was clearly erroneous because that Amendment does not
attach until after conviction and sentencing. 248 To determine the ap-
plicable constitutional standard, the court held, it must determine
what constitutional protection governs this particular point on the
custodial con tin uum. 249
The court recognized that in a prior case, it held that a seizure
continues throughout the time an arrestee is in the custody of arrest-
ing officers and that any use of excessive force during this period is
subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.250 Pierce contended that the
Fourth Amendment should also supply constitutional protection to an
arrestee who is kept at a booking facility prior to a probable cause
hearing or arraignment. 251
 The court reasoned that in order to accept
this argument, it would have to assume that a seizure continues past
the point of initial arrest.252
242 Austin, 945 F.2d at 1160 n.3.
243 See 76 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1996).
244 Id. at 1036..
243 Id. at 1042.
243 See id.
247 Id.
243 Pierce, 76 F.3d at 1042 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 392 n.6 (1989) (not-
ing that the Eighth Amendment does not apply until after conviction and sentence)).
249 Id.
233 Id. (citing Robins, 773 F.2d at 1010).
251 Id. at 1042.
252 Id.
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Like the Tenth Circuit in Austin, the Pierce court was persuaded
by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Gerstein, which applied the
Fourth Amendment to assess the duration of and legal justification
for pretrial detention. 253 This authority, according to the court, pro-
vided sufficient justification for assessing the conditions of such cus-
tody under the Fourth Amendment. 254 Accordingly, the court held
that the Fourth Amendment sets the applicable constitutional limits
on the treatment of an arrestee detained without a warrant until a
probable cause hearing is provided. 255
In 1989, in Henson v. Thezan, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois adopted this same line of reasoning. 256
According to Kenneth Ray Henson's complaint, after his arrest for
suspicion of rape and attempted murder, his arresting officers threw
him down a flight of stairs before beating him in an interrogation
room.257 Henson argued that because the officer in Graham exerted
most of the fcirce at issue after the suspect was in police custody, the
U.S. Supreme Court implicitly held that a seizure continues beyond
the point of arrest. 25B Therefore, Henson argued, the Fourth
Amendment properly governed his claim. 259
In addressing the defendant's reliance on Wilkins, the court
agreed that Graham calls Wilkins's analysis into question. 260 In Wilkins,
the Seventh Circuit drew a line between seizure and detention by
holding that the former ends when the police have the individual in
custody. 261 The court noted that Graham. applied the Fourth Amend-
ment despite the fact that the plaintiff was in custody. 262 In other
words, according to the Henson court, Graham undercut the view that
a seizure ends at the moment the police gain custody and control of
the suspect. 265
253 See Pierce, 76 F.3d at 1043.
254 See id.
255 Id.
256 See 717 F. Stipp. 1330, 1336 (N.D. III. 1989).
257 Id. at 1331.
256 See id. at 1334.
259 See id.
266 Id.
261 Henson, 717 F. Stipp. at 1334.
262 Id.
263 Id. at 1335 ("Gorham seems to hold, contrary to Wilkins, that when the police beat
an individual senseless after gaining control over (initially seizing) him, the Fourth
Amendment still can provide the appropriate framework for assessing the lawfulness of
their conduct.").
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Similar to the courts in Austin and Pierce, the Henson court ac-
knowledged a parallel to Gerstein, in which the U.S. Supreme Court
applied the Fourth Amendment to assess the duration of post-arrest,
pre-arraignment custody.264 The court noted that although Graham
made no mention of Gerstein, its willingness to apply the Fourth
Amendment to the officer's use of force after Graham was in custody,
makes it more likely that the Fourth Amendment should at least apply
until an arrestee has appeared before a judicial officer for a probable
cause hearing.265
As the foregoing discussion shows, the federal circuit courts of
appeals have adopted divergent approaches to adjudicate the exces-
sive force claims of pretrial detainees.266 Each approach varies with
respect to whether the Fourth Amendment applies only to the precise
moment an individual is seized or if it also applies to events beyond
that pont t. 267
Among those courts interpreting the Fourth Amendment to ap-
ply beyond initial arrest under the continuing seizure and hybrid ap-
proaches, there is additional disagreement over precisely how long
that Amendment continues to apply.268 The next Part of this Note ar-
gues that those jurisdictions adopting the hybrid approach employ
the most practical and accurate reading of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments as they have been expounded by the U.S. Supreme
Cour t.269
N. ANALYSIS: THE HYBRID APPROACH IS THE MOST CONSISTENT
WITH U.S. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT AND THE MOST
INSTITUTIONALLY FEASIBLE
The hybrid approach is the best-reasoned and most practical
method of adjudicating the excessive force claims of post-arrest, pre-
trial suspects. 2" This model is the most faithful to recent U.S. Su-
preme Court precedents interpreting the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 271 Since Graham v. Connor; the Court has clearly mani-
fested its intention to expand Fourth Amendment protections and to
264 See id.
266 See id. at 1335-36.
266 See supra notes 160-265 and accompanying text.
267 Compare Haskin, 262 F.3d at 879, with Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 192.
2E8 Compare Haskin, 262 F.3d at 879, with Austin, 945 F.2d at 1160.
269 See infra notes 270-377 and accompanying text.
270 See infra notes 275-377 and accompanying text.
271 See supra notes 111-153 and accompanying text.
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limit the availability of substantive due process claims. 272 The hybrid
approach best achieves this dual aim, 275 This approach also has supe-
rior practicality because: 1) it supplies a bright line of constitutional
demarcation; 2) by making use of already required judicial proceed-
ings, it imposes no additional procedural barriers on law enforcement
officials; and 3) due to its furnishing of judicial approval of pretrial
detention, it supplies a logical point at which to impose a more de-
manding burden of proof on plaintiffs under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 274
A. Courts Holding That Fourth Amendment Protection, Ends with the
Completion of an Arrest Ignore U.S. Supreme Court Precedent
Lower federal courts refusing to apply the Fourth Amendment
past the point of initial arrest often rely on the argument that its ap-
plication to pretrial detainees would be an unwarranted expansion of
constitutional law. 275 This view, however, ignores U.S. Supreme Court
precedents that have already interpreted the Fourth Amendment to
protect this class of individuals. 276 The U.S. Supreme Court's decisions
in Gerstein v. Pugh and County of Riverside v. McLaughlin expanded the
scope of Fourth Amendment protection to the area of pretrial deten-
60'1. 277 These cases provide a § 1983 cause of action under the Fourth
Amendment for pretrial suspects detained without probable cause
hearings. 278 Courts citing these cases have properly noted that be-
cause they did not relate to excessive force they are only persuasive
authority.279 These courts, however, have failed to acknowledge the
dicta in these cases that show that their reasoning is directly applica-
ble to excessive force claims. 288
Although Gerstein and McLaughlin pertained to the duration of,
and legal justification for, prolonged custody of pretrial detainees, the
Court discussed the Fourth Amendment in broader terms.281
 The
Court explicitly recognized that the Fourth Amendment applies to
272 Scc Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271-72 (1994); County of Riverside v. McLaugh-
lin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991).
275 See infm notes 275-377 and accompanying text.
271 See infra notes 347-377 and accompanying text.
275 See Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 194 (7th Cir. 1989).
276 Pierce v. Multonmah County, 76 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1996).
277 See, e.g., Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155, 1160 (10th Cir. 1991).
278
 See McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56; Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975).
279 See Austin, 945 F.2d at 1160.
280 See Centel'', 420 U.S. at 125 n.27.
291 Sce McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56; Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 12511.27.
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the entire criminal justice system, not merely one aspect of 4..282 The
Court observed that the requirements of the Fourth Amendment ap-
ply broadly to the rights of suspects incident to their detention pend-
ing trial, not simply the duration of and justification for that deten-
tion. 288 Most importantly, the Court noted that the standards for
pretrial detention, not merely the procedures, are derived from the
Fourth Amendment. 284 Thus, after Gerstein and McLaughlin, it is
difficult to maintain that the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable to
pretrial detainees' excessive force claims. 288
One possible argument against Gerstein's support for the Court's
effort to expand Fourth Amendment protection to pretrial detainees
is that it was decided before Graham, which explicitly left open the
question of whether pretrial detainees were protected by the Fourth
Amendment.288 Two years after Graham, in McLaughlin, however, the
Court clarified its position by reaffirming and expanding upon Ger.
stein.287
The McLaughlin Court explicitly recognized that the Fourth
Amendment continues to protect pretrial detainees past the point of
initial arrest. 288 Indeed, the Court held that under the Fourth
Amendment, it may be permissible in certain cases to wait four days
before providing a detainee with a probable cause hearing. 28  Thus,
the Court acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment can protect
pretrial detainees up to four days following an arrest. 29° Although
Graham cast doubt on whether the Court would continue to apply the
Fourth Amendment past the point of initial arrest, McLaughlin rees-
tablished the Court's broad interpretation of the Amendment's
bread th .291
It can also be argued that the probable cause determinations re-
quired by Gerstein and McLaughlin relate back to the initial act of ar-
rest.292
 This argument suggests that a probable cause determination is
282 Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 125 n.27.
289 Id.
284 Id. at 111.
285 See McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56; Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 125 n.27.
286 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989). At first glance, this seems to be a
plausible argument, especially in light of the significant changes in the Court's member-
ship from Gerstein to Graham. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
287 See McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56.
288 See id.
284
 Sec id. at 58-59.
29° See id.
291 See id.
292 See McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 50; Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 111.
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not concerned with the standards or conditions of pretrial detention
but focuses instead on whether there was an adequate legal
justification for the arrest and subsequent detention. 293 Therefore, it
is suggested that these cases do not apply to the conditions of pretrial
detention such as the use of force. 294 This argument, however, is un-
persuasive.295
Although a probable cause determination examines the circum-
stances surrounding an arrest, that does not explain why, according to
the U.S. Supreme Court, the act of detaining an individual without
such a hearing, days after an arrest, is itself an independent violation
of the Fourth Amendment. 299 In Gerstein and McLaughlin, Fourth
Amendment claims did not arise from the arrests themselves but from
the continued detention of suspects without hearings. 297 This is con-
vincing proof that the U.S. Supreme Court interprets the Fourth
Amendment to provide protection past the point of arrest regarding
the conditions of pretrial detention. 298
A final argument against application of the Fourth Amendment
to pretrial detainees' excessive force claims is that Gerstein and
McLaughlin. involved interpretations of the Fourth Amendment's
probable cause requirement. 299 This argument notes that in cases of
excessive force, it is the Fourth Amendment's reasonable seizure re-
quirement that is actually violated." This portion of the Amendment,
it is suggested, is not advanced by Gerstein, and McLaughlin into the
period of pretrial detention."' This argument, however, ignores the
fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has historically interpreted the
Fourth Amendment's probable cause and reasonable seizure re-
quirements in tandem." Consequently, it is illogical to argue that
one requirement of the Fourth Amendment can be applied to pretrial
detainees to the exclusion of others."
295 See McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 50; Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 111.
294 See McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 50; Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 111.
295 See infra notes 296-298 and accompanying text.
296 See McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56; Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114.
297 See McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56; Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114.
298 See McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 55; Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114.
299 See Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 193.
399 See id.
591 See id.
592 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,356-57 (1967).
505 See id.
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B. Exclusive Reliance on the Doctrine of Substantive Due Process Conflicts
with U.S. Supreme Court Precedent Limiting That Doctrine
In addition to ignoring the U.S. Supreme Court's recent Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, courts relying exclusively on the doctrine
of substantive due process in the post-arrest, pretrial context disre-
gard the U.S. Supreme Court's recent efforts to limit the availability of
substantive due process claims. 304 In Parrott v. Taylor, Graham, and Al-
bright v. Olive); the U.S. Supreme Court clearly expressed its growing
distaste for the vague and open-ended area of substantive due process
law where a more specific constitutional provision might apply."5 In
each of these cases, the Court explicitly acknowledged its intent to
limit the availability of substantive due process claims.306
In Graham the Court openly criticized the lower federal courts for
utilizing substantive due process analyses where the Fourth Amend-
ment could have been applied instead. 307 This criticism continued in
Albright, in which the Court described substantive due process as an
impetus for irresponsible judicial decision making." 8 Justice Scalia
wrote separately in Albright to emphasize that the pretrial period was
no longer an area where substantive due process claims could be
maintained against law enforcement officials."5 According to Scalia,
this foreclosure stems from the availability of more specific constitu-
tional protections. 515 Justice Kennedy also wrote separately in Albright
to point out that the Court's recent limitations on the doctrine of sub-
stantive due process were not a series of isolated decisions but part of
a cohesive pattern that sought to minimize the circumstances in
which such claims could be advanced."' According to Kennedy, this
pattern began with the Court's 1981 decision in Parratt. 312
One possible response to Kennedy's contention is that this
shrinkage of substantive due process does not reach pretrial detain-
ees' excessive force claims due to Graham's incorporation of Bell v.
Wolfish.313 In leaving open the question of whether the Fourth
3" See, e.g., Albright, 510 U.S. at 271-72.
305
 Albright, 510 U.S. at 271-72; Graham, 490 U.S. at 395; Parratt v. Taylor, 951 U.S. 527,
543 (1981).
306 See, e.g., Albright, 510 U.S. at 27I-72.
3°7 990 U.S. at 393.
308 See 510 U.S. at 271-72.
3°5 See id. at 276 (Scalia, J., concurring).
310 See id. (Scalia_]., concurring).
311 See id. at 284 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
312 See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
313 See Graham, 990 U.S. at 395 n.10.
2003]	 Protecting Pretrial Suspects from Excessive Force 	 1389
Amendment. protects pretrial detainees from excessive force, the Gra-
ham Court held that tinder Bell, the Due Process Clause protects pre-
trial detainees from the use of excessive force that amounts to pun-
ishment.514 Thus, despite the Court's efforts to limit the availability of
substantive due process claims in other areas, it is argued, the Court
chose not to do so in the context of pretrial detainees' excessive force
claims."8 The persuasiveness of this argument is diminished, however,
when the class of individuals protected in Bell by the Fourteenth
Amendment is distinguished from individuals detained at earlier
stages on the custodial continutun. 518
The plaintiffs protected under the Fourteenth Amendment in
Bell were individuals housed at a facility specifically built for the long-
term housing of detainees who, for security reasons, were required to
remain in custody until trial.517 As the Court pointed out, this class of
individuals shares more in common with convicted criminals than
with post-arrest detainees merely in custody for booking proce-
dures." 8 The Court acknowledged that the Eighth Amendment's pro-
scription of cruel and unusual punishment could not protect these
plaintiffs because that Amendment did not apply until after convic-
tion and sentencing. 519
Instead, the Bell Court relied on the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to provide pretrial detainees with protection
analogous to that supplied by the Eighth Amendment.829 As one court
applying the Bell standard observed, it is impractical to distinguish the
claims brought by the plaintiffs in Bell from the claims of convicted
prisoners due to the similarity of the conditions surrounding their
confinements" Thus, although using the broad term "pretrial de-
514 Id.
515 See id.
316 Compare Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 524-25 (1975) (plaintiffs protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment were pretrial detainees required to remain in custody until trial;
these detainees were housed in a penal facility for extended periods of time), with Pierce, 76
F.3d at 1036 (plaintiff receiving Fourth Amendment protection was also technically a "pre-
trial detainee" but was only kept in custody for four hours until administrative booking
procedures were completed).
317 441 U.S. at 524.
518 See id. at 546 n.28. Indeed, the housing facility in Bell not only housed pretrial de-
tainees but convicted inmates as well. Id. at 524.
519 See id. at 535 n.16.
520 Id.; see Beyer, supra note 226, at 69 (noting that the Bell Court discusses the Eighth
Amendment at length because the due process standard it formulates is borrowed from
the Eighth Amendment).
321 Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1946 (5th Cir. 1993).
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tainee,"322 the Bell Court referred specifically to those detainees kept
in detention after administrative booking for extended periods of
time prior to trial 323 Therefore, foreclosing the availability of substan-
tive due process claims to pretrial detainees at earlier stages on the
custodial continuum does not conflict with the holdings of Bell or
Grahall1. 324
C. The Hybrid Approach Accounts for Both Lines of U.S. Supreme Court
Precedent Expanding the Fourth Amendment and Limiting the
Availability of Substantive Due Process Claims
The hybrid approach adopted by the lower federal courts in ad-
judicating the excessive force claims of pretrial detainees is able to
synthesize both lines of precedent discussed above.325 -Those courts
refusing to apply the Fourth Amendment past the point of initial ar-
rest are unable to account for the U.S. Supreme Court's rulings that
the Fourth Amendment may apply for several days beyond that
point.326
 Additionally, courts relying exclusively on the doctrine of
substantive due process ignore the efforts by the U.S. Supreme Court
to limit that doctrine's availability where a more specific constitutional
provision may apply. 327 The Court's decisions in Albright, Gerstein, and
McLaughlin clearly demonstrate that the Fourth Amendment does, in
fact, apply to pretrial detainees. 328
Equally flawed are those courts that adopt the "continuing sei-
zure" approach.329
 Although this approach properly recognizes that a
seizure continues past the point of initial arrest, it is unable to supply
a clear stopping point to Fourth Amendment protection. 330 Taken to
its logical conclusion, this approach envisions a seizure lasting from
the time a suspect is arrested until the time he or she is either acquit-
ted or convicted. 3" This mode of analysis is unable to account for the
U.S. Supreme Court's recognition in Graham that under Bell, a due
322 See cases cited supra note 316.
323 See 441 U.S. at 524.
324 see id.
323 See supra notes 111-153 and accompanying to Xt.
326 See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 125 n.27.
322 Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.
328 Albright, 510 U.S. at 274; McLaughlin, 500 U.S . at 56; Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 125 n.27.
329 See, e.g., Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871,879 (9th Cir. 2001).
"0 See id.
331 See, e.g., Albright, 510 U.S. at 279 (Ginsburg, J. , concurring).
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process analysis governs pretrial detainees' excessive force claims after
prolonged periods of detention.3"
Proponents of the continuing seizure model may argue that Bell
and Graham do not present a problem because under their approach,
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments are interpreted to provide
concurrent protection. 333 Therefore, it may be suggested, a due proc-
ess excessive force claim may be advanced contemporaneously with a
Fourth Amendment excessive force claim. 334 This argument, however,
ignores the Graham Court's admonition that where a Fourth Amend-
ment claim is available, a plaintiff cannot also assert a substantive due
process claim.3" Thus, the Court in Graham implicitly reasoned that
plaintiffs bringing excessive force claims under Bele s due process
standard could not also avail themselves of a Fourth Amendment
claim. 336
Unlike the continuing seizure and substantive due process ap-
proaches, the hybrid approach accounts for U.S. Supreme Court
precedent regarding both the Fourth Amendment and the doctrine
of substantive due process.337 Under the hybrid approach, Fourth
Amendment protection ends when a suspect is brought before a judi-
cial officer for a probable cause hearing. 338 After that point, a de-
tainee's § 1983 claim must be brought under the Fourteenth
Amendment."
332 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10.
333 See, e.g., Haskin, 262 F.3d at 881.
334
 See id.
333 490 U.S. at 395.
3" See id. One response to this argument is that the Bell Court's due process standard
incorporated by Graham is one of procedural, not substantive, due process. See MacDonald,
supra note 25, at 183-84. Therefore, it may be suggested, the availability of such a claim to
pretrial detainees would not conflict with the Court's efforts to limit substantive due proc-
ess claims. Sec id. This argument, however, ignores the fact that the primary issue in proce-
dural clue process cases is whether a plaintiff was deprived of a protected liberty interest
without a hearing. See Beyer, supra note 226, at 143. Graham, however, was not concerned
with any pre- or post•excessive force hearing. See Phillips, supra note 71, at 559. Rather, the
Court was concerned with the substantive rights of detainees to be free from the arbitrary
beatings, a hallmark of substantive due process. Sec McCormick, supra note 181, at 72
(characterizing the Bell standard as one of substantive due process). Indeed, it would be
quite unusual for the Court to declare that force that is excessive somehow becomes per-
missible because a hearing has been provided. Sec id. Thus, the most feasible reading of
the Graham Court's reference to Fourteenth Amendment protections is one of substantive
due process. See id.
"7 See supm notes 111-153 and accompanying text.
338 See Austin, 945 F.2d at 1160.
339
 See id.
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This mode of analysis is able to account for the U.S. Supreme
Court's holdings in Gerstein and McLaughlin that the Fourth Amend-
ment applies to pretrial detainees until a probable cause hearing. 340
Thus, the hybrid approach renders arguments inapposite that such
application of the Fourth Amendment is an unwarranted expansion
of constitutional law. 341
 Additionally, by foreclosing the availability of a
substantive due process claim prior to a probable cause hearing, the
hybrid approach complies with the U.S. Supreme Court's efforts in
Parratt, Graham, and Albright to eliminate substantive due process
claims where a more specific constitutional claim is available.342
Finally, the hybrid approach is able to account for the Court's
pronouncements in Bell and Graham that after a prolonged period of
custody, pretrial detainees' excessive force claims must be brought
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 343 Un-
der the hybrid approach, Fourth Amendment protections end after a
probable cause hearing.344
 Thus, that Graham and Bell require indi-
viduals detained for extended periods to bring excessive force claims
under the Fourteenth Amendment is perfectly consistent with the hy-
brid approach.345
 This approach would also apply the Fourteenth
Amendment because under Gerstein and McLaughlin those suspects
would have already received probable cause hearings.346
D. The Hybrid Model Is the Most Practical Approach
One of the major criticisms of applying the Fourth Amendment
in the post-arrest context is that there is no clear and non-arbitrary
point at which to terminate its protections.347
 According to the Fourth
Circuit in Riley v. Dorton, the most logical point at which to cut off
Fourth Amendment protections following an arrest would be when
the suspect leaves the custody of his or her arresting officer. 348 As the
Riley court pointed out, however, this is not a bright line of constitu-
tional demarcation because it makes application of the Fourth
Amendment depend on the fortuity of how long an arresting officer
345
 McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56; Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114.
841
 Austin, 945 F.2d at 1160.
542 Albright, 510 U.S. at 271-72; Graham, 490 U.S. at 395; Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543.
343 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10.
544 Pierce, 76 F.3d at 1043.
345 See McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56.
546 See id.
347 See, e.g., Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159,1164 (4th Cir. 1997}.
346 See id. at 1162,1163-64.
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happens to remain with the suspect. 349 This perceived absence of a
practical point at which to cut off Fourth Amendment protection led
the court to rely exclusively on the Fourteenth Amendment. 350
The hybrid model, however, cannot be criticized for failing to
provide a clear stopping point of Fourth Amendment protection."'
Under this approach, Fourth Amendment protections end when a
suspect receives a probable cause hearing.352 This line is neither for-
tuitous nor arbitrary, in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in
Gerstein and McLaughlin, which clearly set out the guidelines for when
a probable cause hearing must be granted. 353 In most cases, according
to the Court, a probable cause hearing will be granted within forty-
eight hours of arrest.354 Therefore, the hybrid model eliminates the
opportunity for police to avail themselves of the more deferential
Fourteenth Amendment standard by immediately taking a suspect
from the custody of his or her arresting officer."'
The hybrid model's provision of a clear point of constitutional
demarcation fulfills the need recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court
for readily applicable bright-line rules in the Fourth Amendment con-
text.'" According to the Court, the need for bright-line rules in this
area relates to the Fourth Amendment's purpose of regulating police
behavior.357 That is, Fourth Amendment doctrine must be expressed
in terms that are readily applicable by the police in the context of
their daily activities."' The hybrid model, through its utilization of a
bright line at a preexisting point in the criminal process, fulfills this
end. 359
The hybrid model's utilization of procedures already required by
U.S. Supreme Court precedent demonstrates its institutional practi-
cality in an additional way. 3" In holding that the Fourth Amendment
requires a probable cause hearing prior to extended detention, the
Court in Gerstein, expressed concern with imposing cumulative hear-
549 Id. at 1164.
"0 See id. at 1166.
551 See Pierce, 76 F.3d at 1043.
152 Id.
555 McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56; Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114.
n4 See McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56.
555 See Riley, 115 F.3d at 1164.
555 See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981); Mitchell W. Karsch, Excessive Force
and the Fourth Amendment: When Does Seizure End ►, 58 FoRtninm L. REV. 823, 827-29 (1990).
357 Belton, 453 U.S. at 458.
355 See id.
559 See id.
360 Sec Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 113.
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ing requirements on law enforcement.361 According to the Court, this
concern could be met by the States' ability to combine the probable
cause hearing with preexisting procedural requirements such as bail
hearings or arraignments.362
In contrast to Gerstein, which involved a new procedure to be in-
tegrated with established ones, the hybrid model merely makes addi-
tional use of an established procedure. 363 Thus, the hybrid approach
is able to account for the Gerstein Court's concern with imposing cu-
mulative procedural requirements on law enforcement. 364 The hybrid
approach is even better suited to address this concern because it adds
nothing new to criminal procedure. 365
 Although the continuing sei-
zure and substantive due process approaches do not impose addi-
tional procedural requirements on law enforcement, they lack the
additional advantage of complying with U.S. Supreme Court prece-
dents as the hybrid model does. 366 Thus, the hybrid model is the su-
perior approach because it both harmonizes U.S. Supreme Court
precedents and has a negligible effect on criminal procedure. 367
Finally, the hybrid model supplies the most practical approach
because it provides a logical point at which to terminate Fourth
Amendment protections and impose a more demanding burden of
proof under the Fourteenth Amendment.368 Under this approach,
Fourth Amendment protections end when a suspect receives a prob-
able cause hearing. 363
 This line of constitutional division is inherently
sensible from a practical standpoint. 370 At a probable cause hearing, a
judicial officer either ratifies or rejects the actions of the police in
seizing a suspect."' At this stage, state officials also decide whether to
charge a suspect, and if so, whether to release or detain him or her
until trial. 372
In the period before a probable cause hearing, however, a sus-
pect's custody may be based solely on the discretion of a single police
36 ' See id.
362 See id. at 123-24.
363 See, e.g., Pierce, 76 F.3d at 104
364 Sce420 U.S. at 113.
365 See Pierce, 76 F.3d at 1043.
366 See supra notes 111-153 and
367 See id.
368 See Beyer, supra note 226, at
87 (Idaho 1991)).
369 Pierce, 76 F.3d at 1043.
370 See Beyer, supra note 226, at
371 Id.
372 Id.
3.
accompanying text.
76 (citing Grant v. City of Twin Falls, 813 P.2d 880, 886—
76 (citing Grant, 813 P.2d at 886-87).
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officer.373 At that point it remains to be seen if the arrest should have
even occurred. 374 At this stage, it makes intuitive sense to subject
claims of excessive force to the less deferential Fourth Amendment
standard because the custody lacks judicial sanction. 375 In the period
following a probable cause hearing, however, the propriety of an ar-
rest and continued detention have been judicially assessed. 376 Judicial
approval of arrest and continued detention thus marks a practical
point at which to impose the more demanding burden of proof upon
plaintiffs under the Fourteenth Amendment because it provides an
objective evaluation of police behavior. 377
CONCLUSION
The hybrid model is the soundest method of adjudicating the
excessive force claims of post-arrest, pretrial detainees. Unlike the
substantive due process and continuing seizure models, this approach
is able to account for the U.S. Supreme Court's recent expansions of
Fourth Amendment protections and its limitations on the availability
of substantive due process claims. Additionally, the hybrid model is an
inherently practical approach to adjudicating these claims. This prac-
ticality stems from its ability to supply a bright line of constitutional
demarcation and its use of preexisting judicial proceedings that im-
pose no further procedural burdens on law enforcement. The hybrid
model's provision of judicial approval of an arrest and continued de-
tention further demonstrates its practicality because such approval
provides a logical point at which to impose a more demanding bur-
den of proof under the Fourteenth Amendment. Because of the hy-
brid model's doctrinal consistency and inherent practicality, it is the
approach best suited to illuminate the constitutional twilight zone.
EAMONN O'HAGAN
373 See id.
374 See id.
373 See Beyer, supra note 226, at 76 (citing Grant, 813 P.2d at 886-87).
376 See id.
377 See id.
